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MY “VERY IDEA” OF ROD — AND YOURS
Remarks to the Symposium on the Legal Imagination of Rod Macdonald
McGill University
February 7, 2014

Harry Arthurs
York University
Introducing a symposium on the legal imagination of Rod Macdonald would be a
daunting task under any circumstances. It is made even more so by the constraints
under which I labour. I can’t hope to match the comprehensive overview that Andrée
Lajoie provides in the book she will launch this afternoon. Nor can I compete with the
focused exploration of specific aspects of Rod’s work which will be offered by the six
panels scheduled for today and tomorrow. Nor, because he has forbidden us to be
maudlin, can I do what I would like most to do — to spend the next half hour expressing
my admiration and affection for Rod. I have therefore taken my clue from something
Rod says frequently and in various formulations: “The very idea of law [he says] must
be autobiographical”. 1 If that’s true, then the “very idea” of Rod himself must be
“autobiographical”. I’m therefore going to begin our symposium by sharing my
autobiographical — and consequently idiosyncratic — idea of Rod and his work. This
idea has been shaped by our many encounters over some four decades. It may not
accord with your idea of Rod’s scholarship or, for that matter, with his. However, as
Rod himself strongly advocates “pluralizing the legal subject”, it will be interesting to
see what happens when we put his theory into practice.
For convenience’s sake, I’m going to engage with four aspects of his work that have
variously impressed, persuaded, puzzled and exasperated me — sometimes all at
once. Specifically, I’m going to say something about Rod’s antipathy to borders and
boundaries; about his relentless search for virtue; about his style of argumentation;
and finally about his inclination to magic realism.

2
Savant sans frontières
We live in a world where in many respects borders seem to be hardening — borders
between nations, classes, religions, cultures, ethnicities, epistemologies, ideologies,
professional specialisms, academic disciplines and legal regimes, to name a few. They
are hardening despite the Enlightenment, despite technology, despite globalization
and, alas, despite the best efforts of Roderick A. Macdonald. Rod rejects borders.
“Personal” or “political” or “professional”: for Rod these are just labels that obscure
more than they reveal. Teacher or student: for Rod both are equal partners in the
search for understanding. Mathematics or music, genetics or jurisprudence, it’s all the
same to him: just another useful way of looking at life. High law or low law, common
law or civil law: all way stations along Rod’s trans-systemic, trans-disciplinary road to
better understanding. Building docks in Ontario’s cottage country or creating a legal
framework for secured transactions in the Ukraine: for Rod these are just occasions for
shaping appropriate responses to people’s particular circumstances and varied needs.
In short, Rod is the quintessential savant sans frontières. He constantly demonstrates
how and why we must deconstruct concepts and break down categories that impede
the search for understanding, justice and virtue. He does this by insisting, not only on
the possibility of integrating all forms of knowledge, but on the inevitability of people’s
interconnectedness, on the inescapable mixité of communities, on the hybridity of
institutions and the contingency of rules and, above all, on the role of the individual as
the ultimate source and destination of legal and moral knowledge, agency and
responsibility.
Rod’s open borders policy makes huge intellectual demands on him and, frankly, on his
readers. In one recent article, for example, Rod discusses musicology, biology and
virology as metaphors for norm migration. 2 However, after ensuring that readers have
mastered these difficult subjects, he rejects them all and takes refuge on the moral high
ground of Aristotelian philosophy. Why, I am tempted to ask, did he not start where he
was ultimately going to end up? The answer surely is that for Rod, the journey — the
border-crossing — is at least as important as the destination.
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In search of virtue
But the destination is important too. Rod is always searching for virtue, for the moral
high ground. This will become clear in the panel discussions, especially those
concerned with fairness and with distributive justice. However, it is the moral
dimension of his search that I want to comment on. In the article I’ve just referred to,
Rod relies on the concept of phronesis, which is central to his own thinking. Rod
explains phronesis:
… [T]he capacity to be sensitive to the particularities of a given situation is a
necessary condition for moral agency. Even if universal moral principles were to
exist, they would not be self-applying. The moral agent … is never relieved of the
responsibility for making decisions. As moral agents we must therefore
constantly reassess what it is we think we know. This, in turn, means cultivating
openness to and reciprocity with others. 3
So far so good. However, the article dealt with attempts to standardize certain rules of
international trade law. As far as I have been able to observe, “cultivating openness to
and reciprocity with others” has not been a prominent feature of the so-called
Washington Consensus, nor of regimes of trade law, nor of actual-existing international
business relationships. “Openness” and “reciprocity”, I contend, are likely to become
more widespread (if at all) only with a change in power relations, which is to say only
after the current model of U.S.-led neo-liberal globalization enters its declining stages.

In his work, if only occasionally, Rod acknowledges the existence of power:

Human beings are social animals who find meaning in the relationships they
build with others [he says somewhere] but …[s]adly, these relationships are not
always bilateral or equitable, for human beings in the Western cultural tradition
also appear to have an insatiable appetite to project their views about life,
community, social organization, spirituality and justice onto others …. through …
episodic violence; … through psychological manipulation; … through religious
crusades, … and sometimes by economic coercion ….
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If our appetite for power and domination is indeed insatiable, if the means we are
prepared to use are so despicable, how does this square with our innate responsibility
and capacity as moral agents? In Rod’s view this contradiction is attributable in part
to our reliance on the state. He characterizes the state as “the primary vehicle for selfassertion and domination of the other” and he insists that “whether exercised for
malignant or benign purposes, political power … tends toward authoritarian
subjugation”. 5

How, then, does he propose to reverse the tendency towards subjugation? Rod
genuinely favours giving priority to distributive rather than restorative justice which
makes him a small-s, small-d social democrat. However, because he is uneasy about
the state, Rod can also be called a diffident social democrat. He musters much more
enthusiasm for ideas and initiatives that empower individuals: acknowledgement that
they constitute the state rather than vice-versa for example; affirmation of their status as
legal agents rather than legal subjects; the provision to citizens of opportunities and
resources that will translate these concepts into practical reality; the “unbundling” of
state functions to make them more responsive to the needs and desires of citizens.
Don’t misunderstand me. Rod is no egoist, let alone a closet libertarian; he is not now
nor has he ever been a market fundamentalist. It is just that he has laid out his own
unique route to the moral high ground of social democracy, of distributive justice, by
way of individual capacity and responsibility.

Methodology

My “very idea” of Rod — perhaps mistaken — is that he has chosen that route partly
because of his preferred methodologies, partly because of his temperament. I’ll explore
those two notions in that order — methodology first. Though he dazzles in almost any
intellectual vernacular, Rod’s preferred methodologies seem to be philosophy and
poetry. I’ve already mentioned that Aristotle’s concept of phronesis captures a central
aspect of his approach to life and therefore to law. That’s just one of many instances
when he uses philosophical methods to work towards his conclusions, and
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philosophical concepts to encapsulate those conclusions in his memorable prose.
Indeed, I would argue that Lessons from Everyday Law is lodged firmly in the
philosophic tradition of inductive argument from the observed experience of everyday
life. But Rod is not just a philosopher. He is also a poet, a skilled practitioner of
metaphor, allusion, allegory. “Allegory” he explains “… is a vehicle for phronesis, a
form of expression that does not allow for a final propositional message that is separate
from the story itself, easily transmissible, formulaic and universalized….”
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— a form of

expression, in other words, that ensures that each reader, each listener, will have to
pursue virtue by trying to understand themselves and others.

A philosopher and a poet, then, but apparently not an empirical social scientist. For
example, in a recent piece Rod and David Sandomiersky write
…While we locate ourselves as legal pluralists, we nonetheless take our distance
from empirical, social scientific conceptions of legal pluralism. 7
Indeed, Rod takes his distance from empirical social science in many similar
statements. However, such disclaimers must be taken with a grain of salt. Rod — the
savant sans frontières — is constitutionally incapable of taking his distance from any
form of knowledge, any mode of analysis, that provides enlightenment. For example,
his wonderful essay, Office Politics, 8 reveals him to be an anthropologist, an
ethnomethodologist of the first order; so does Lessons of Everyday Law. 9 Moreover,
his understanding of institutions like federalism, of relationships like families, and of
processes like law-making is thoroughly grounded in empirical evidence including (as
his footnotes often reveal) evidence amassed by the very social scientists from whom
he distances himself.

But I will concede that the social sciences are not Rod’s

preferred mode of analysis. This, as he himself has acknowledged, 10 constitutes
something of a “paradox” for someone as deeply involved in society and social relations
as Rod is. That paradox can be resolved, I think, by considering Rod’s relationship
with reality.

6
Magic realism
Here is how the Macdonald-Sandomierski article I’ve just mentioned describes legal
reality:
Legal norms, in whatever site of law, are imagined by human beings, given
expression by human beings, lived by human beings, followed by human beings,
modified by human beings, rejected by human beings — in a word, constituted
by human beings not primarily as passive legal subjects, but above all as active
legal agents. 11
I have no problem with this formulation, so far as it goes, but there does seem to be
something missing. That missing element is power 12 — power that permeates many
sites of law, that warps human imaginations, that stunts freedom of expression, that
prevents people from adhering to certain legal norms or forces them to do so against
their will. All too often, indeed, power trumps phronesis and determines whether
human beings become passive legal subjects or active legal agents, or neither — but
simply disenfranchised, debilitated or even dead. I’ve made this point to Rod over the
years:
… I have the sense [I wrote to him once] that you continue to overestimate the
power of the individual, to underestimate the power of the state, class, culture
and corporation …. I sense that a more tragic view of life, a recognition of its
large and little brutalities has to be introduced into your picture of identitynegotiating citizens. 13
Rod responded by calling me a “tragic realist”. I retaliated by calling him a “magic
realist”.

On reflection, I think my flippant rejoinder was not far off the mark.

Rod — in his work as in his life — engages with reality as a thoroughgoing optimist or,
as I call him, a magic realist. By contrast, I’m at best a Gramscian optimist — an
optimist of the will, but a pessimist of the intellect. I believe — like Gramsci and unlike
Rod — that “man is … a product of history, not of nature.” Seeing Rod as a magic
realist helps to explain a lot — especially his always-imaginative and well-conceived
projects to levitate justice: to mobilize ordinary Canadians in a bottom-up process of
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law reform; to unbundle government programs to allow citizens to shape their own
identity; to introduce a new “Swiss army knife of governance” that will ensure social
justice while preventing the growth of an overbearing state; to invent a trans-systemic
legal education that will not only be able to resist the intense parochialism of the bar but
ultimately transform our understanding of law. Truly, truly I admire the noble
ambitions and imaginative design of each of these projects. But they do represent a
magical view of reality, a determined optimism that isn’t quite quixotic, but nonetheless
fails to factor power into the equation. Rod, I conclude, takes his distance from
empirical social science because it is foreign to his nature and (as he perceives it) at
odds with the concept of phronesis that informs so much of his thinking.
Let me illustrate this point by referring to Office Politics. You’ll recall that that article
concerns the allocation of newly-vacated offices in a law faculty. It is epistolary in form:
it reproduces an imagined exchange of memos between the dean and faculty members
asserting their claims to the office they think they deserve, as well as challenging the
claims of others and in some cases impugning the dean’s fairness and good faith. The
narrative demonstrates, says Rod, “the value of constitutive practice for reaffirming the
subtle and informal normative orders that make associational life possible”. 14 It’s his
article, and he is entitled to draw his own conclusions. However, stated as it is, Rod’s
conclusion confirms to me that he is indeed a magic realist. Everyone in the story —
save “the dean”, save Rod himself — seems utterly unconcerned about “associational
life”. On the contrary, each faculty member seems to be driven not to improve the
quality of collegial relations, not to secure justice or virtue, but to expend precious
intellectual and moral capital in an effort to enhance their personal comfort,
convenience or prestige.
One final example. In the mid-1990s, Rod and I were members of the law program of
the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research. Fraser Mustard, the founder and
director of the Institute, was incapable of conducting a conversation that did not include
mention of “the gradient”. The gradient in question was the product of a sophisticated
epidemiological study, the Whitehall Study, that closely linked health outcomes to
socio-economic status. Very crudely put, the gradient showed that the higher your
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status, the better your prospects of living a long, healthy, productive and satisfying
life. 15 As a tragic realist, I thought this was what Bora Laskin used to call “a
penetrating glimpse into the obvious”. Indeed, the same gradient seemed to me to
determine a whole host of outcomes from people’s political influence to their access to
social and cultural goods to their enjoyment of legal rights. However, mere mention of
“the gradient” drove Rod to distraction. There were other reasons no doubt, but at
some level, I think, Rod’s optimism, his magic realism, would not allow him to accept
the determinism implicit in the very notion of a “gradient”. 16 He just could not
acknowledge that their socio-economic status is what makes some people into active
legal agents and others into passive legal subjects.
A new research agenda
We’ve all been challenged to identify the implications of Rod’s work for future
research. I think I’ve now identified a key item on that agenda. On the one hand, we
are all attracted by Rod’s commitment to phronesis, his vision of individuals as moral
and legal agents: it’s a vision that not only promises a better society for all of us but a
better life for each of us — a life exemplified by the one Rod has made for himself. But
on the other hand, I’m surely not the only tragic realist in the room. Many of us — Rod
included — are deeply concerned about the powerful and destructive forces at loose in
the world. Many of us are convinced that power can seldom be challenged effectively
by individuals — even exceptional individuals, even steadfast practitioners of
phronesis. And many of us are convinced that new and better forms of political,
economic and social relations are essentially projects that require collective action and,
in many cases, state action. So here is my nomination for a future, Rod-inflected
research question: how can we push back the forces of injustice and selfishness, how
can we mobilize for positive collective action, how can we create effective institutions
and governments, how can we build a just society — without at the same time
impairing our individual capacity, and denying our individual responsibility, for moral and
legal action?
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Conclusion
I said at the outset that my “very idea” of Rod is necessarily autobiographical and
therefore likely different from yours. Now I want to shift my ground. At any academic
gathering, the only person wearing a bow tie he has tied with his own two hands is
likely to be Rod. In that sense, the “very idea” of Rod begins for all of us with the man
himself, with his unique human qualities, with the breadth of his interests and the
depths of his understanding, with his unrelenting search for meaning and for justice. All
of these function as a bow tie. They give his work remarkable intellectual coherence
and imprint it with a unique moral DNA. If there were such a thing as a blind tasting of
legal scholarship, Rod’s work would be instantly recognizable. That’s why I think I can
conclude in a very matter-of-fact, non-maudlin way by saying that Rod is sui generis.
He is one of Canada’s most conscientious and constructive citizens, one of its most
imaginative and influential scholars, and one of its most decent human beings. That is
my “very idea” of Rod; and I’m sure it’s yours as well.
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